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Abstract
In Parts of Classes, David Lewis argues that mereology is ontologically innocent, and
connects this to the thesis that composition is identity. This chapter investigates
whether mereology can be regarded as ontologically innocent even if composition is
not identity. One idea is that we are all implicitly committed to the existence of
arbitrary sums even before we accept mereology, so that accepting mereology does
not give us any new commitments. A different idea is that, although accepting
mereology gives us new ontological commitments, the additional entities do not add
explanatory complexity, so do not offend against considerations of parsimony.
Keywords: mereology; composition; ontological innocence; ontological commitment;
parsimony; David Lewis.
Read it again:
…Mereology is ontologically innocent.
To be sure, if we accept mereology, we are committed to the existence of all
manner of mereological fusions. But given a prior commitment to cats, say, a
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing
over and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take
them together or take them separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality
either way. Commit yourself to their existence all together or one at a time,
it’s the same commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of Reality
according to your scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the cats
and then also list their fusion. In general, if you are already committed to
some things, you incur no further commitment when you affirm the existence
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2of their fusion. The new commitment is redundant, given the old one. (Lewis
1991, 81-82)
There is something very attractive about much of this. And yet for many of us,
perhaps even for Lewis, there is something rather repulsive about the thesis that
composition is identity. Can we salvage the attractive elements, whilst rejecting the
repulsive? My goal is to extricate and examine Lewis’s ideas about ontological
innocence, commitment and double counting, attempting to understand these
primarily as epistemic or methodological claims. How far can we get down this route
without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?
1. Ontological Innocence
Lewis’s main purpose in this section of Parts of Classes is to show that mereology is
ontologically innocent. In this context, ‘mereology’ means the thesis that
composition is unrestricted; this contrasts with moderate views of composition,
according to which composition occurs in some cases but not in others, and with
nihilist views, according to which composition never occurs. What does it mean to
say that mereology is ontologically innocent? A clue: in this respect, mereology is
like plural quantification and unlike set theory.
When we quantify plurally over ordinary things, we do not, according to Lewis,
secretly quantify over sets or classes of those things. When we say that the fans of the
Chieftains are many, we are not saying, of the set which has all and only the
Chieftains fans as members, that it has the property of being many-membered.
Instead, we are talking about the individual fans of the Chieftains, and saying that
they are many.
[Plural quantification] is not ordinary singular quantification over special
plural things…Plural quantification, like singular, carries ontological
commitment only to whatever may be quantified over. It is devoid of set
theory and it is ontologically innocent. (Lewis 1991, 68-9, see also 102).
If you are already committed to the existence of some objects, perhaps by accepting
sentences which quantify over them in a singular way, then you do not take on any
extra ontological commitments when you accept sentences which quantify over those
same things again in a plural way. After all, you are just quantifying over those same
3things again. (As is standard, I will take it that ontological commitment attaches
primarily to theories or sentences, and derivatively to the people who believe such
theories or sentences.)
Set theory, in contrast, is not ontologically innocent, because of singleton-formation.
Set theory is not innocent. Its trouble has nothing to do with gathering many
into one. Instead, its trouble is that when we have one thing, then somehow
we have another, wholly distinct thing, the singleton. And another, and
another…ad infinitum. But that’s the price for mathematical power. Pay it.
(Lewis 1991, 87)
If you are already committed to the existence of some objects, and you then accept set
theory, you thereby take on extra ontological commitments, including commitment to
the existence of the various singletons of the various objects you were already
committed to. (And so on ad infinitum.) The singletons were not previously in your
ontology, but now they are: this shift, induced by accepting set theory, is thus not
ontologically innocent.
So ontological innocence is a kind of ontological conservativeness: you can accept an
ontologically innocent claim without thereby adding to the list of entities whose
existence you are committed to. This suggests that whether a theory or sentence is
ontologically innocent may be a relative matter: whether it carries additional
commitments for you may depend upon what ontological commitments you already
have. But this relativity plays no role in the case of mereology. The thesis of
unrestricted composition does not unconditionally specify what composite objects
there are; instead, it makes conditional claims e.g. that if there are some cats, then
there is the fusion of those cats. Mereology is ontologically innocent if and only if the
claim that there is a fusion of (e.g.) the cats is ontologically innocent for anyone who
has already accepted that the cats exist. Likewise, moderate views of composition
involve conditional existence claims which may or may not be ontologically innocent.
Why does it matter whether mereology is ontologically innocent? For Lewis, the
ontological non-innocence of set theory is a cost, albeit one worth bearing in order to
receive the benefits of mathematical power. This suggests a methodology of theory
choice based on criteria including ontological parsimony, in line with Lewis’s
4methods and methodological reflections elsewhere (e.g. Lewis and Lewis (1970); for
discussion see Nolan (2005, chapter 9) and Nolan (forthcoming, section 3)). When
choosing between theories, we should weigh up the costs and benefits of each option,
for example the relative unity and economy of each theory. Other things being equal,
a theory which involves fewer ontological commitments is preferable to one which
involves more. If mereology is ontologically innocent, then accepting mereology
does not add to our ontological commitments; this removes one obstacle to accepting
mereology.
But why think that mereology is ontologically innocent? If composition is identity,
then ontological innocence is secured. Suppose that you are committed to the
existence of some objects; you are thereby committed to the existence of any object(s)
they are identical to. If composition is identity, then you can now accept a theory
according to which those objects compose something, without thereby expanding
your ontology. When you tally up your ontological commitments, having accepted
the existence of the composite object, it would be a mistake first to count the original
objects, and then to increase the total by adding an object – the composite – which is
identical to those you have already counted. That would be double-counting: a miser
does not increase his wealth by counting the same pennies over and over again.
If composition is identity, then any claim that some objects have a sum is
ontologically innocent, given a prior commitment to those initial objects. So if
composition is identity, then the thesis of unrestricted composition is ontologically
innocent, as are more moderate claims that certain pluralities of objects have sums,
though others do not. Then the thesis of unrestricted composition, moderate accounts
of composition, and nihilism about composition are all on a par with respect to
ontological parsimony. We can therefore base our theory choice on other criteria.
But what if composition is not identity? Is there some way of showing that
mereology is ontologically innocent, other than by identifying wholes with parts?
In section 2 I will examine the idea that a commitment to the parts somehow
automatically involves a commitment to the whole. On this view, accepting
unrestricted composition does not bring any additional burdens because the burdens
5were already incurred before the thesis of unrestricted composition was accepted. I
call this the levelling-up account of ontological innocence: it entails that moderate and
nihilist views of composition are just as costly as unrestricted composition, even if
their advocates do not realise this.
In section 3 I will examine the idea that, although accepting unrestricted composition
does expand your ontological commitments, this expansion is somehow not relevant
to theory choice: these additions to the ontological burden do not affect the ‘price’ of
the theory. I call this the levelling-down account of ontological innocence: it entails
that unrestricted composition is no more costly, for purposes of theory choice, than
are either moderate or nihilist views of composition. (The consequences for theory
choice may seem the same either way, and we might wonder whether levelling up and
levelling down are genuinely different options; I will return to this issue in section 4.)
The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether mereology can reasonably be
called ‘ontologically innocent’ even if composition is not identity. This is an
appealing prospect, for several reasons. First, it fits with much, though not all, of
what Lewis says in section 3.6 of Parts of Classes, most obviously the reiteration of
ontological innocence paired with the rejection of Donald Baxter’s strong
composition as identity thesis. I do not think we can make full sense of everything
Lewis says: some of his claims seem plausible only if composition is identity in a
non-analogical way, but he explicitly denies the non-analogical thesis. (Sider 2007
and Bohn 2011 attempt to wrangle this.) Moreover Lewis clearly goes beyond claims
of ontological innocence (pages 85-6 especially). And I do not think that there is a
uniquely best way of vindicating the claims about ontological innocence without
composition as identity. Indeed, some of Lewis’s remarks point towards the
levelling-up account, and others towards the levelling-down account, whilst his
remarks about Armstrong-style partial identity point towards a different notion of
almost-innocence (compare Lewis 1993). Nevertheless, there’s much to be gained by
examining the options.
Second, and relatedly, I think this captures what seems attractive in the passage I
quoted at the outset: acknowledging the fusion of the cats doesn’t really add much to
an ontology which already includes the cats; this isn’t a great extra ontological burden
6to carry; it’s not like adding the souls of the cats, the hive-mind of the cats, the
invisible friends of the cats, or an extra eight legs for each cat. Can we substantiate
these attractive thoughts without accepting composition as identity?
Third, if any argument in favour of unrestricted composition can be found in Lewis’s
discussion, it is an argument from the ontological innocence of composition claims,
rather than an argument direct from the thesis that composition is identity. Ross
Cameron has recently argued that composition as identity does not entail unrestricted
composition (Cameron 2012; McDaniel 2010 has a different argument to the same
conclusion). In outline, his argument is this: if composition is identity, then whenever
a plurality has a sum, that sum just is its parts. But that fact doesn’t determine the
conditions under which a plurality has a sum, and in particular it doesn’t entail that
every plurality has a sum. ‘Allowing that identity can be many-one simply doesn’t
tell us how ubiquitous cases of many-one identity are’ (2012, 534, Cameron’s italics).
In other words, the General Composition Question is not the Special Composition
Question (van Inwagen 1990, Hawley 2006, although compare Spencer 2012).
Nevertheless, composition as identity could provide defensive material for the thesis
that composition is unrestricted, by entailing the ontological innocence of that thesis,
thus rebutting the charge of ontological profligacy. If we can establish the ontological
innocence of the thesis of unrestricted composition without resort to composition as
identity, then this defensive move is still available. And this seems to be Lewis’s
approach: he does not infer unrestricted composition direct from composition as
identity, but instead seems somewhat tempted towards composition as identity as a
foundation for ontological innocence. So ontological innocence without composition
as identity promises as much support for unrestricted composition as we should have
expected from composition as identity itself.
2. Levelling Up and Ontological Commitment
In this section I investigate the levelling-up account of the ontological innocence of
unrestricted composition. The idea is that a commitment to the existence of some
objects automatically carries with it a commitment to the existence of their sum.
Once you accept the existence of the cats, you are thereby committed to the existence
of their fusion, whether you realise it or not. So accepting the thesis of unrestricted
7composition does not give you any further commitments; the commitment to the
existence of the fusion was already incurred when, as a small child, you incurred a
commitment to the existence of kitties.
For the levelling-up account to have any plausibility, it must be possible for us to have
ontological commitments we are unaware of: we can safely assume that Peter van
Inwagen has examined his own beliefs, and yet he is adamant that he is committed to
the existence of cats but not to the existence of cat-fusions (1990, 1994). Howard
Peacock (2010) distinguishes the explicit from the implicit ontological commitments
of a theory. Roughly speaking, the explicit commitments are what the theory says
there is – the commitments which would be recognised by anyone who understood the
theory – whilst the implicit commitments are those things which are required for the
truth of the theory. If a commitment to the parts brings a commitment to the whole,
as the levelling-up account has it, this must be an implicit rather than an explicit
commitment. After all, van Inwagen understands his own beliefs yet does not
recognise any commitment to cat fusions.
But what is it for something to be required by the truth of a theory? Peacock
construes this modally: the requirements of the theory are those things which exist in
every possible world in which the theory is true. Even setting aside issues about
generic and specific requirements (Parsons 1970), this construal means that every
possibly-true sentence carries ontological commitment to all necessary existents, such
as numbers and perhaps God.
Whatever the independent merits of this modal construal of implicit ontological
commitment, it cannot be what Lewis had in mind, because it does not discriminate
between mereology and set theory. We are trying to underwrite the idea that a
commitment to the parts just is a commitment to the whole, so that if you are already
committed to the existence of the parts, then the claim that the whole exists is
ontologically innocent. In contrast, a commitment to Possum is not supposed to
involve a commitment to Possum’s singleton: the claim that the singleton exists is
ontologically non-innocent, according to Lewis. But the singleton of Possum exists in
every world in which it is true that Possum exists, satisfying Peacock’s modal account
of implicit commitment.
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Rayo (2007) takes the ontological commitments of a sentence to be the ontological
demands which it imposes on the world; a sentence’s ontological commitments are
thus an aspect of its truth conditions, i.e. the demands it imposes on the world. As
with Peacock’s requirements, Rayo’s demands reach beyond the explicit
commitments immediately grasped by anyone who understands the sentence:
I shall use demand-talk in such a way that it obeys Kripke-style substitution
rules for names and predicates. Thus, since Hesperus is Phosphorus, there is
no difference between the demand that the world contain Hesperus and the
demand that the world contain Phosphorus. Similarly, since being composed
of water just is being composed of H2O, there is no difference between the
demand that human bodies be composed mostly of water and the demand that
human bodies be composed mostly of H2O. (Rayo 2007, 429)
However Rayo does not give a simple modal construal of demand-talk: not every
object which must exist if the sentence is to be true counts as an ontological
commitment of the sentence. The number two exists in every world in which ‘St
Andrews is in Fife’ is true, yet it is not an ontological commitment of that sentence.
What then are the demands imposed on the world by a sentence’s truth? Wisely,
Rayo defers this question: ‘The demands imposed on the world by a sentence’s truth
are simply the sentence’s truth-conditions. So one’s understanding of the former
should be informed by one’s understanding of the latter.’ (2007, 429; see also Rayo
2008 section 3.2) Likewise, I will not attempt to explicate the notion of truth
conditions here (though I touch on this again in section 2.3).
Given the levelling-up account, the thesis of unrestricted composition is ontologically
innocent because the existence of the whole is demanded by the truth of the claim that
the things which are its parts exist. For example, on this view it is an aspect of the
truth conditions of ‘Possum exists and Macavity exists’ that the fusion of Possum and
Macavity exists. In other words, ontological commitment transmits through the
composition relation, just as it transmits through the identity relation. I will call this
the transmission thesis. In the rest of this section, I explore the nature, justification,
and dialectical role of the transmission thesis.
92.1 What is the Transmission Thesis?
There are weak and strong versions of the transmission thesis. On the weak version,
if a sentence carries ontological commitment to some things, and they have a sum,
then the sentence also carries ontological commitment to the sum. On the strong
version, if a sentence carries ontological commitment to some things, then it also
carries ontological commitment to their sum. If composition is in fact unrestricted,
then the weak and strong transmission theses are extensionally equivalent: for every
sentence, they will agree as to the ontological commitments of that sentence.
But the weak and strong transmission theses give different results if either moderate
or nihilist views of composition are correct. For example, suppose that nihilism is
true: there are no composite objects. Then, according to the weak transmission thesis,
a commitment to the existence of some objects carries no further ontological
commitment. But according to the strong transmission thesis, a commitment to the
existence of some objects also carries commitment to the existence of their
nonexistent sum. It is standardly thought that sentences can carry ontological
commitment to nonexistent things; one very good reason for judging a sentence false
is that it is ontologically committed to something which does not exist. This is why
ontological commitment cannot be understood as a relation between sentences and
things in the world.
Nevertheless, the strong transmission thesis is wildly implausible, even incoherent, if
composition is not unrestricted. The ontological commitments of a sentence are the
ontological demands imposed by the truth of the sentence upon the world. Suppose
that Possum and Macavity each exist, yet they do not have a sum. The sentence
‘Possum exists and Macavity exists’ is true, but by hypothesis the sum does not exist.
So evidently the truth of the sentence does not demand the existence of the sum. So
the sum is not amongst the ontological commitments of the sentence, which is
nevertheless committed to the existence of Possum and of Macavity. Therefore a
commitment to the existence of Possum and of Macavity does not involve a
commitment to the existence of their sum if they do not have a sum.
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The levelling-up account requires a transmission thesis. The strong transmission
thesis is certainly false if either a moderate or a nihilist view of composition is true.
Moreover it is extensionally equivalent to the weak transmission thesis if composition
is in fact unrestricted. To give the levelling-up account its best chance, I will
therefore work with the weak transmission thesis.
Suppose the weak thesis is true. And suppose that van Inwagen (1990) is right that
things have a sum when (and only when) they participate in a life together. If we are
committed to the existence of some things, and if they participate in a life together,
then we are committed to the existence of their sum. We may not know that we have
a commitment to the sum (our commitment is not explicit), either because we are
benighted nihilists who have not realised the truth of van Inwagen’s moderate view,
or because we are unaware of the empirical fact that those things participate in a life
together.
Now continue to suppose that the weak transmission thesis is true, but suppose that
van Inwagen is wrong and Lewis is right about composition. Then whenever we are
committed to the existence of some things, we are committed to the existence of their
sum. Again, we may fail to realise that we have this commitment, not for empirical
reasons this time, but rather because we have not have realised the truth of Lewis’s
thesis of unrestricted composition.
2.2 Is the Weak Transmission Thesis True?
If composition is identity, the weak transmission thesis is true: implicit ontological
commitment transmits through the identity relation, as between Hesperus and
Phosphorus. (Composition as identity does not vindicate the strong transmission
thesis. Ontological commitment transmits through the composition relation, if
composition is identity, but this does not determine when the composition relation in
fact holds. This illustrates, once again, the difference between the General and
Special Composition Questions.)
Can we justify the weak transmission thesis without resorting to composition as
identity? We can construct a notion of ‘ontological fauxmitment’ which transmits
through the composition relation: if you have an ontological commitment to some
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objects, and they have a sum, then by definition you have an ontological fauxmitment
to the sum. Then our question is whether an ontological fauxmitment is a genuine
ontological commitment.
There is no point in consulting criteria of ontological commitment, like Quine’s
famous dictum that a first-order sentence carries commitment to Fs just in case Fs
must be counted amongst the values of the variables in order for the sentence to be
true (for this formulation, see Rayo 2007, 430). Such criteria tell us about the
circumstances under which sentences of certain kinds carry certain ontological
commitments; they do not elucidate the notion of ontological commitment itself. Nor
can we make progress by consulting our intuitive notion of ontological commitment,
for there is no such intuitive notion (Sider 2011, 202).
Instead we need to pursue a larger project, considering the theoretical roles played by
ontological commitment in the hope of establishing whether ontological fauxmitment
also plays these roles. First, there is the connection with truth-conditions: the
ontological commitments of a sentence are an aspect of its truth-conditions. Given
that some objects have a sum, is it an aspect of the truth-conditions of the sentence
which posits the existence of those objects that the sum exist also? Is the sentence in
some sense about the whole, even though it does not explicitly mention the whole?
(Compare: is ‘Possum exists’ in some sense about Possum’s singleton, even though
the set is not explicitly mentioned? Likewise: is ‘the fans of the Chieftains are many’
in some sense about the set of Chieftains fans?) Intuition does not guide me in this
territory; a proper investigation would take us through debates about truth conditions
and truth-making.
Second, there is a connection between ontological commitment and theory-choice.
When we compare the ontological costs of different theories, should we include their
ontological fauxmitments as well as their standard ontological commitments? Do the
ontological fauxmitments contribute to the ontological profligacy of a theory, just as
the standard ontological commitments do? If so, then it would be sensible to count
ontological fauxmitments as genuine ontological commitments. I will discuss
ontological profligacy and parsimony in section 3.
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2.3 Dialectical Role of the Weak Transmission Thesis
If – if – the weak transmission thesis is true, if fauxmitments are genuine
commitments, how should this affect the debate about theories of composition? If
composition is in fact unrestricted, then accepting the truth of the unrestricted
composition thesis brings us no additional ontological commitments: van Inwagen
and the rest of us are already committed to the existence of arbitrary sums via our
commitment to ordinary entities. If cat-fusions exist, then there is a sense in which
we already believe in them, even whilst we strenuously deny that they exist. But if
composition is in fact not unrestricted, then we do not already have these ontological
commitments, so would be expanding the list of things to which we are ontologically
committed if we mistakenly accepted that composition was unrestricted.
This creates a rather delicate situation regarding theory choice. Suppose that you
accept the weak transmission thesis and are currently agnostic about the existence of
any composite objects. You realise that if you follow Lewis and accept unrestricted
composition you will believe in retrospect that your move was cost-free, and that your
moderate and nihilist friends have failed to recognise the extent of their own
commitments. You also realise that if instead you accept a moderate view of
composition you will believe in retrospect that your move was cost-free, that your
nihilist friend has failed to recognise the extent of her own commitments, and that
your Lewisian friend’s decision to accept unrestricted composition has committed her
to the existence of many non-entities. Finally, you realise that if you opt for nihilism,
you will think that both your moderate and your Lewisian friends have committed
themselves to the existence of many non-entities.
You know what you will think in retrospect, whatever you decide. Whichever theory
you accept, once you accept it you will believe that it was ontologically cost-free (this
makes sense of Lewis’s evangelical tone). But how should this affect your decision
whether to accept that composition is unrestricted, if you are currently agnostic?
Set aside the other costs and benefits of the various theories of composition (for
example, their interaction with debates about metaphysical indeterminacy); set aside
questions about the relative badness of over-expanding versus over-contracting your
ontology. If you want to use ontological parsimony as a criterion for theory-choice,
13
how should you apply it in this situation? There are two options. The first is to
compare what the various theories would add to your current ontological
commitments. The second is to compare what the various theories say about what the
correct total ontology is.
The second option makes better sense, for two reasons. First, given the weak
transmission thesis, you do not know what your ontological commitments are before
you know which theory of composition is correct, so you cannot make the relevant
comparison. Second, if we value ontological parsimony, then presumably this is
because we think the world as a whole is likely to be well-represented by a
parsimonious theory (ceteris paribus), not because we especially loathe new
ontological commitments. If we value ontological parsimony, we should willingly
accept a theory which brings us new ontological commitments, so long as it
repudiates a greater number of our old ontological commitments. What matters is
what a theory says about the total size of the world.
The thesis of unrestricted composition says that the world contains an enormous
number of objects, many more than the world contains according to either moderate
or nihilist theories of composition. So if we value ontological parsimony, this is a
point against unrestricted composition.
The weak transmission thesis does justify the claim that, if composition is in fact
unrestricted, then accepting the truth of the unrestricted composition thesis is an
ontologically innocent move: we are already committed to the myriads of composite
objects. So if we have good independent reason to think that composition is
unrestricted, then we have good reason to claim that mereology is ontologically
innocent, i.e. that accepting mereology merely makes explicit the vast ontological
commitments we had implicitly incurred already. But this conditional fact is
dialectically ineffective within the debate about composition; in particular it does not
help the advocate of unrestricted composition to rebut the claim that her thesis is
ontologically profligate.
3. Ontological Parsimony
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According to the levelling-up account – discussed throughout section 2 – a
commitment to some objects automatically carries a commitment to anything those
objects compose, because ontological commitment transmits through the composition
relation. This account levels up because it entails that, just as the advocates of
unrestricted composition are committed to arbitrary sums, so too (unwittingly) are the
advocates of moderate and nihilist accounts of composition, if composition is indeed
unrestricted.
According to the levelling-down account – to be discussed in this section – accepting
that composition is unrestricted involves commitment to extra entities, but this is
irrelevant to theory choice. When we weigh up the costs and benefits of rival
theories, these additional entities are cost-free, because they are related by
composition to objects which are also acknowledged by rival views. This account
levels down because it entails that, for the purposes of theory-choice, advocates of
unrestricted composition are no worse-off in this respect than advocates of either
moderate or nihilist accounts of composition, despite having more objects in their
ontology.
The levelling-down account might be justified by talk of fundamentality or grounding.
Suppose that wholes are grounded in or are less fundamental than their parts, or that
only mereological atoms are fundamental. Suppose also that, for the purposes of
assessing the ontological parsimony or profligacy of a theory, only the fundamental or
ungrounded entities count. Then the levelling-down account of ontological innocence
would be vindicated: unrestricted composition brings along extra entities, but not ones
which really matter.
I will not pursue this line of justification in this paper, for several reasons. First, there
are excellent discussions of these issues elsewhere (e.g. Cameron this volume,
deRosset 2010, Schaffer 2008, Williams 2010). Second, this talk of fundamentality
and grounding is insufficiently Lewisian for my present purposes. Third, I am trying
to make sense of the alleged ontological innocence of mereology as following not
from the metaphysical nature of the composition relation – whether that be a relation
of identity or of grounding – but from primarily methodological or epistemic
considerations.
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3.1 Varieties of Parsimony
E.C. Barnes (2000) distinguishes anti-quantity from anti-superfluity principles of
parsimony. An anti-quantity principle urges us to minimise the number of elements
(individuals or kinds) in our theories. An anti-superfluity principle urges us to avoid
elements which are superfluous by the lights of the theories they feature in. Suppose
we are comparing two theories. One posits many entities, each with an explanatory
role to play, whilst the other posits only a few entities, including one which is
explanatorily idle. Prioritising anti-superfluity parsimony directs us towards the first
theory, whilst prioritising anti-quantity parsimony directs us towards the second
theory.
According to the levelling-down account, accepting the thesis of unrestricted
composition commits us to the existence of many additional objects, but these objects
do not ‘count’ for the purposes of assessing relative parsimony. The parsimony at
stake here is best understood in terms of anti-quantity rather than anti-superfluity
principles. This is because the additional objects – cat-fusions and worse – are not
superfluous by the lights of the theory they feature in. The thesis of unrestricted
composition does various jobs for Lewis and his fellow travellers, for example in
solving the problem of the many, addressing puzzles about persistence, and avoiding
both brutality and indeterminacy about composition. Most pertinently, the thesis is
central to Lewis’s account of sets, which is why he dwells upon its alleged ontological
innocence in Parts of Classes.
If arbitrary sums offend against a principle of parsimony, it is an anti-quantity
principle. To assess whether they are truly offensive we need to make a further
distinction amongst anti-quantity principles. Quantitative parsimony is determined by
the sheer number of individual entities to which a theory is committed; qualitative
parsimony is determined by the number of different kinds of entity to which a theory
is committed. (Combining this standard terminology with Barnes’s useful distinction
is somewhat confusing: anti-quantity principles urge us to favour both quantitative
and qualitative parsimony.) I will consider these types of parsimony in turn.
3.2 Is Unrestricted Composition Quantitatively Profligate?
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The thesis of unrestricted composition certainly has a prima facie problem of
quantitative profligacy. The world according to unrestricted composition is much
more heavily populated than the world according to moderate or nihilist views of
composition; the levelling-down account of ontological innocence must explain why
this population explosion does not count against the thesis of unrestricted
composition.
In Counterfactuals, Lewis writes ‘I subscribe to the general view that qualitative
parsimony is good in a philosophical or empirical hypothesis; but I recognise no
presumption whatever in favour of quantitative parsimony’ (1973, 87). In context,
this is convenient for Lewis, given his quantitatively-profligate ontology of possible
worlds of the same qualitative kind as our actual world. It would help him here too,
allowing him to disregard the quantitative profligacy of unrestricted composition. But
Daniel Nolan (1997) and Alan Baker (2003) have persuasively argued that
quantitative parsimony does matter, alongside qualitative parsimony and other
theoretical virtues; no doubt opponents of unrestricted composition would agree with
them. Moreover Lewis is making a point specifically about composition in section
3.6 of Parts of Classes, rather than dismissing quantitative parsimony in general.
So I will take it that the levelling-down account must explain why the quantitative
profligacy of unrestricted composition does not count against it, given the assumption
that quantitative parsimony counts in favour of a theory in other contexts.
Why does quantitative parsimony usually count in favour of a theory ? According to
Baker ‘Quantitative parsimony tends to bring with it greater explanatory power’
(2003, 258). Baker’s central example concerns the neutrino, which was postulated in
order to explain why mass-energy and spin – quantities which are supposed to be
conserved – seem to go missing when an electron is emitted from an atom during beta
decay. Why did physicists hypothesise that a single neutrino with spin ½ is emitted in
each decay event, carrying all the ‘missing’ mass-energy and spin, instead of
postulating that ten mini-neutrinos are emitted together, each with spin 1/20 and each
carrying 1/10 of the ‘missing’ mass-energy?
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The hypotheses are equally ranked for qualitative parsimony, each postulating one
new type of particle (the neutrino versus the mini-neutrino). Both hypotheses are
well-designed to explain the phenomena of beta decay, including the ‘missing’ mass-
energy and spin. And, according to mini-neutrino theory, each mini-neutrino is
causally active: none is a superfluous idle wheel. But, argues Baker, the mini-
neutrino hypothesis fails to explain why, across various experimental scenarios, we
never see entities of spin 1/20 existing separately from the pack; nor does it explain
why we never see entities with spin 7/20, and so on. To explain these facts, we need
to complicate the mini-neutrino hypothesis by stipulating that these particles
inevitably hang out together in groups of ten. This in turn must either be added to the
list of facts which need explanation, or else be added to the list of fundamental facts
about the world. Either way, the overall picture looks messier than the single neutrino
hypothesis. Quantitative parsimony is valued because it typically reduces explanatory
complexity. (It is a further question why explanatory complexity is itself a theoretical
vice; Huemer 2009 compares different rationales for preferring parsimony in science
and philosophy.)
How might these considerations apply to parts and wholes? The thesis of unrestricted
composition lacks quantitative parsimony. As well as cat-fusions and the like, it is
committed to the existence of trout-turkeys, i.e. ‘the mereological fusion of the front
half of a trout plus the back half of a turkey’ (Lewis 1991, 7). These extra entities
certainly seem to generate additional explanatory complexity. Consider ‘congruence’
facts about the relationship between parts and wholes: we need to explain why trout-
turkeys are always located in a sub-region of the region collectively occupied by a
trout and a turkey, why they are inevitably somewhat scaly and somewhat feathery,
why certain causal interactions with a trout constitute causal interactions with a trout-
turkey, and so on. If there are no trout-turkeys, there are no such ‘facts’ to explain.
But we have explanations of such facts ready to hand, via our understanding of
congruence facts for ordinary composite objects. If we can understand why turkeys
are always located where their parts are, then we can understand why the same holds
for trout-turkeys. And so on. So although unrestricted composition commits us to
lots of extra entities, it does not require any additional explanatory complications in
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order to explain how those entities behave, and how they relate to their parts. The
usual reason for preferring quantitative parsimony does not hold sway in this case.
Nihilists about composition may still object (though see Sider 2003). Any theory
which posits any composite objects, no matter how few, incurs explanatory burdens
which the nihilist need not assume. (Nihilists have explanatory burdens of their own,
of course.) So we may say that, for purposes of theory choice, the quantitative
profligacy of the unrestricted composition thesis puts it at no disadvantage relative to
moderate views of composition, although both unrestricted and moderate views are
disadvantaged relative to nihilism.
3.3 Is Unrestricted Composition Qualitatively Profligate?
In very general terms, the additional composite objects countenanced by unrestricted
composition are of the same kind as the entities accepted by moderate accounts of
composition. Cat-fusions and trout-turkeys are just more composite material objects,
with many familiar physical properties such as mass, charge, and shape. Moreover,
they need not all have the peculiarly inflexible modal and temporal identity conditions
often attributed to ‘mere sums’: advocates of unrestricted composition do not
typically distinguish between ‘mere sums’ and other composite objects.
But in less general terms very many of these additional objects seem to fall under
novel kinds: they add qualitative diversity to our ontology, not just quantitative
diversity. The extent of this additional qualitative diversity will depend upon the rival
theories to which unrestricted composition is compared. For example, van Inwagen,
who believes that all composite objects are alive, would point out that unrestricted
composition commits us to the existence of a significantly different new kind of thing:
inanimate composite objects. Even those who accept the existence of armchairs,
buildings and continents would point out that unrestricted composition brings
commitment to some very peculiar new species such as the trout-turkey
We can distinguish three sorts of concern about trout-turkeys. The first is quantitative
profligacy, as already discussed: the trout-turkeys are yet more objects. The second is
qualitative profligacy: given that the kind trout-turkey is supposed to supplement, not
replace, the kinds trout and turkey, this inflates the number of kinds in our ontology.
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The third is a more direct objection to trout-turkeys (and other arbitrary sums) per se
on the grounds that they are strange entities, not recognised by common sense.
Whatever the merits of this third objection, it is not addressed by the levelling-down
account of ontological innocence. If you have a direct intuition that there simply is
nothing composed of the front half of this trout and the back half of that turkey, then
you will not be consoled by the thought that, although there is such a thing, it does not
render unrestricted composition problematically profligate. You might be consoled
by the levelling-up account, according to which you are already committed to trout-
turkeys despite your intuitions, but I doubt it. You might be consoled by the claim
that composition is identity and that trout-turkeys are therefore nothing to worry
about, but (Cameron 2012: 551) will then show you the errors of your ways. The
third trout-turkey concern – the objection from common sense – lies beyond the scope
of this paper, which is concerned with questions of ontological innocence.
So the levelling-down account needs to explain why it is that, although the thesis of
unrestricted composition commits us to the existence of new kinds of thing, this does
not count against the thesis when we compare it to rival theories of composition.
Why does qualitative parsimony usually count in favour of a theory? As with
quantitative parsimony, explanatory complexity seems key. A theory which posits
more kinds of entity must explain the relationships between these different kinds, as
well as explaining the behaviour of individual instances of the various kinds.
As with quantitative profligacy, the levelling-down account has some plausibility
here. The behaviour of trout-turkeys, cat-fusions and other arbitrary sums is
correlated with the behaviour of more familiar objects in predictable ways. We need
not invent new (biological?) laws to govern trout-turkeys, nor, of course, regard the
property of being a trout-turkey as natural to any high degree. We might instead start
to worry that these kinds are superfluous, since they seem explanatorily redundant.
But the advocate of unrestricted composition can accept this concern, and deny that
trout-turkey is a genuine kind. This does not render the individual trout-turkeys
superfluous in the context of the theory; as I argued above, arbitrary sums do
significant philosophical work for Lewis.
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Again, the levelling-down account succeeds in reducing the cost (in this respect) of
unrestricted composition so that it is equal to the cost of moderate theories of
composition: once we are committed to the existence of some composite object,
commitment to further composite objects does not generate additional explanatory
complexity. But the account does not manage to reduce the cost to that of bargain-
basement nihilism. Any non-nihilist account of composition is at a disadvantage with
respect to ontological parsimony; non-nihilist accounts may still be preferable on
other grounds, however.
4. So, Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?
We have investigated whether mereology can reasonably be called ‘ontologically
innocent’, if composition is not identity. If ontological commitment transmits through
the composition relation – if fauxmitments are commitments – then we are all already
committed to the existence of whichever composite objects are countenanced by the
true theory of composition, whether that be nihilism, a moderate view, or the thesis
that composition is unrestricted. But this doesn’t help make the case for unrestricted
composition and its ontologically-profligate picture of the world.
The more promising strategy is to argue that, once we have accepted the existence of
at least some composite objects, the addition of more and weirder such objects to our
ontology does not create additional explanatory burdens, so does not count against
unrestricted composition as compared to moderate views of composition.
When I introduced the levelling-up and levelling-down accounts in section 1, I
acknowledged their apparent similarity. In hindsight, however, they seem quite
different. According to the levelling-up account, we all have the same ontological
commitments (assuming a shared stock of simples), though we do not have any
theory-neutral way of working out what in fact we are committed to. We can,
however, all see that the thesis of unrestricted composition paints a more
ontologically-profligate picture of the world. According to the levelling-down
account, different theorists of composition have different ontological commitments,
but this does not count against the thesis of unrestricted composition as opposed to
moderate views of composition.
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Could we somehow combine the levelling-up and levelling-down accounts? Suppose
fauxmitments are commitments, so we are all already committed to the existence of
those composite objects countenanced by the true theory of composition, whatever
that is. Could we nevertheless argue that unrestricted composition is at least as
plausible as moderate views, because it is explanatorily no more complex than
moderate views? Accepting the levelling-up account does not prevent us from also
accepting the levelling-down account, but the combination of these accounts does not
seem to lend any stronger support to the thesis of unrestricted composition than does
levelling-down alone.
5. Is Decomposition Ontologically Innocent?
I have been discussing rival answers to the Special Composition Question, which asks
about the conditions under which some things compose a whole. The Inverse Special
Composition Question asks about the conditions under which a thing has proper parts;
equivalently, the Simple Question asks about the conditions under which an object is
mereologically simple (van Inwagen 1990, Markosian 1998). Call an answer to the
Inverse SCQ a ‘decomposition thesis’. Are decomposition theses ontologically
innocent? That is, once you are committed to the existence of an object, is it
ontologically innocent to accept that the object has proper parts?
This suggestion might seem puzzling. If both composition and decomposition are
ontologically innocent, how do we ever incur substantive ontological commitments?
But recall that both composition theses and decomposition theses typically make only
conditional existential claims: if there are some cats, they have a fusion; if there is an
extended object, it has a part in each of ‘its’ proper sub-regions. Substantive
commitment comes when we accept the antecedent of such a conditional, and our
question is whether accepting the consequent is then an ontologically innocent move.
Some of Lewis’s remarks suggest that ontological innocence works both ways: ‘It just
is them. They just are it…Commit yourself to their existence all together or one at a
time, it’s the same commitment either way’. Moreover identity is symmetric, so if
composition is identity we should expect consequences for decomposition theses if
there are consequences for composition theses (deRosset 2010, Spencer 2012).
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According to a levelling-up account of the ontological innocence of decomposition, if
the truth of a sentence requires the existence of some object, then it requires the
existence of any parts that object happens to have (‘requires’ here is non-modal). If
you are committed to the existence of an object, then you are implicitly committed to
the existence of whatever parts it has, whether you realise this or not. As with
composition, such implicit commitments cannot play a significant role in debate about
decomposition, nor can they address concerns about ontological profligacy.
According to a levelling-down account of the ontological innocence of
decomposition, once we are committed to the whole, adding the parts does not
increase the ontological ‘cost’ of the theory in question, because they do not increase
its explanatory complexity. As with composition, we could base this claim on the
metaphysical relationship between parts and wholes: perhaps parts are grounded in
wholes, and only ungrounded entities ‘count’ for the purposes of measuring
ontological parsimony (Schaffer 2007, 2010). Again, however, I am trying to
establish ontological innocence without recourse to the metaphysics of the
(de)composition relation. Moreover, basing ontological innocence on notions of
grounding means that either composition or decomposition theses may be innocent,
but not both.
How else might we argue for the levelling-down account? As with composition, once
we have an explanatory framework based on the relation between parts and wholes,
adding extra entities to the picture does make much difference. If we have a place for
a particular object in our ontology, plus an understanding of why in general parts are
located in sub-regions of the whole, then we do not create any further explanatory
tasks by accepting that this particular object has proper parts. So if there are some
proper parts, then the thesis that there are more proper parts is ontologically innocent.
Nihilists about composition still have the upper hand in this respect: whether they
countenance teeming masses of tiny simples, or one big simple universe (Schaffer
2007), adding parthood relations to this picture increases its complexity.
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